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This document is a working document of the services of the Commission. It 
does not represent or prejudice any position the Commission have taken or 
will take in the future, on any of the issues covered. 
Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  working  document  is  to  provide  guidance  to  EU 
supervisors  and  private  stakeholders  as  regards  the  interaction  of  the 
Payment  Services  Directive  (2007/64/EC,  hereafter  "the  PSD")  and  the 
Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  (2005/60/EC,  hereafter  "the  AMLD") 
with respect to the supervision of payment institutions and their reporting 
obligations under the AMLD in various cross-border situations. 
In general terms, it should be observed that, once authorised in its home 
Member  State,  a  payment  institution  (hereafter,  a  "PI")  can  conduct 
business in any other Member State through free provision of services or 
freedom  of  establishment  without  the  need  to  obtain  additional 
authorisations in the host Member State (Article 10§9) of the PSD). Article 
20§4 of the PSD places the authorisation and prudential supervision duty of 
the payment institution (Title II of the PSD) within the responsibility of the 
"home Member State" (as defined in its Article 4§1).   
Concerning  the  transparency  and  information  rules  and  the  conduct  of 
business rules (Title III and IV of the PSD), in relation to payment services, 
payment institutions should respect, at least vis-à-vis consumers, the rules 
of  the  Member  State  in  which  they  are  providing  the  payment  service. 
Therefore, although licensed in a Member State A, the terms and conditions 
of a payment institution for operating in the market of a Member State B are 
regulated by the domestic law implementing the PSD in Member State B. 
As regards infringements to Titles III and IV of the PSD, the competent 
authorities, in cases where the PI works with agents and branches, are those 
of the host Member State (Article 82§2 of the PSD).  
Article  4§2  of  the  PSD  defines  the  "host  Member  State"  as  being  the 
"Member  State  where  the  payment  service  provider  has  an  agent  or  a 
branch or provides payment services…" 
The  AMLD  follows  a  territorial  approach.  It  requires  Member  States  to 
impose  preventive  obligations  on,  inter  alia,  the  payment  institutions 
established on their territory (Article 34 of the AMLD). Contrary to the 
PSD, the AMLD is a minimum harmonisation directive which thus allows 
Member States to "adopt or retain in force stricter provisions" (Article 5 of 
the AMLD).  
2 
It stems from a combined reading of both PSD and AMLD that PIs have to 
respect, as regards their branches or agents, the AMLD rules of the host 
country  and  are  subject  to  the  AML  supervision  of  the  host  country 
performed  in  close  cooperation  with  the  home  country  authorities. 
Prudential supervision per se is still the responsibility of the home country, 
but cooperation with host authorities remains indispensable. 
Against this background, the scope of this working document is limited to 
two scenarios:  
- a payment institution authorised in Member State A (the 'home country') 
has an agent or several agents in Member State B (the 'host country'); 
- a PI authorised in Member State A has a branch in Member State B; 
In both scenarios, questions arise as to the legal rules to be applied to PIs 
agents and branches, the allocation of AML supervisory powers between 
the home and the host authorities and the national Financial Intelligence 
Units  (FIU)  competent  for  receiving  the  reporting  of  suspicious 
transactions.  
The European Commission services are aware of the fact that similar legal 
questions will - or already do - arise with regard to the situation of agents of 
e-money  institutions  as  well  as  e-money  distributors.  The  European 
Commission  services  have  already  launched  some  discussions  on  these 
issues with all relevant stakeholders in order to assess whether some future 
legal  clarifications  would  be  needed.  At  this  stage,  however,  the 
Commission services consider that given the fact that the e-money directive 
came only recently into force (on 30 April 2011), more information, feed-
back and data are needed before any such clarifications can be envisaged. 
But as regards the situation of e-money agents it seems already clear that a 
substantial part of the present working document could be applicable by 
analogy to them. Distributors do, however, give rise to quite different legal 
questions - potentially requiring different legal answers - given their legal 
status  vis-à-vis  e-money  issuers  and  the  nature  of  activities  that  they 
perform.  But  again  more  experience  must  be  gathered  before  assessing 
whether any interpretative work proves justified.  
This document is without prejudice to the rules applicable to the processing 
of personal data which would be carried out in the pursuit of their activities 
by PIs subject to Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive). Article 4 
of this Directive sets out the law applicable to processing activities carried  
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out  in  the  Member  States  and  should  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to 
determine the law applicable to the PI in the situations referred to in this 
document.
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1)  A  payment  institution  authorised  in  Member  State  A  works  with 
agents in Member State B 
The use of agents is widespread and ranges from several hundred in some 
jurisdictions  to  thousands  in  others.  The  services  they  offer  may  pose 
terrorist financing and money laundering risks, as large amounts of cash can 
be handled through payment services such as money remittance.    
As regards occasional transactions (which is normally the rule for money 
remittance services), customer due diligence (CDD) must in principle only 
be  performed  for  transactions  amounting  to  15.000  EUR  (in  a  single 
operation or in several operations which appear to be linked) or, below such 
amount,  where  there  is  a  suspicion  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist 
financing  (Article  7  of  the  AMLD)  or  if  the  occasional  transaction  is  a 
transfer of funds covered by Regulation (EC) No. 1781/2006. It could be 
reasonably questioned whether transfer of funds above 15.000 EUR would 
often be performed through retail agents. But, even below this threshold 
vigilance  is  required  and  CDD  must  be  performed  in  suspicious  cases. 
Moreover, in cases of transfer of funds, information on the payer has to be 
verified by the payment service provider of the payer where the amount 
exceeds 1000 EUR.     
a) Are agents "financial institutions" ?  
For  the  purposes  of  the  AMLD,  branches  of  payment  institutions  are  
assimilated to financial institutions and are therefore individually subject to 
the AMLD obligations (see Article 3§2 (f) of the AMLD) as if they were 
separate financial institutions.  
Unlike branches, agents of payment (or other financial) institutions are not 
considered by the AMLD as being financial institutions themselves,
2 nor do 
they explicitly fall within any of the other categories of institutions/persons 
                                                 
1   See in this regard the Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (doc WP179) available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf 
2   Insurance intermediaries which act as agents of an insurance company however fall under the definition 
of "financial institution" (cf. Article 3 (2) (e) AMLD). In this respect, it seems opportune to assess 
whether, in a possible revision of the AMLD, all agents could be considered as 'financial institutions'.  
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covered by Article 2§1 of the AMLD. If however, by their nature, some 
agents were to fall within any of these categories (e.g. a PI has, as agent in 
Member State B, a credit institution, a branch of a credit institution, or any 
other financial institution such as a bureau de change) then they would be 
directly subject to the AMLD obligations. 
b) Are agents a form of establishment ? 
During discussions held by the Commission services in preparation of this 
working  document,  reference  was  often  made  to  some  ECJ  judgements 
identified  in  the  Commission's  Interpretative  Communication  of  26  June 
1997
3 on the "Freedom to provide services and the general good in the 
Second Banking Directive".   
Since this Communication was adopted, more recent case law is available. 
In particular, in its judgement of 11 June 2003 (case C-243/01, Gambelli) 
the ECJ held: 
"45.  It  must  be  remembered  that  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of 
establishment for nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member  State,  including  restrictions  on  the  setting-up  of  agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries, are prohibited by Article 43 EC. 
46.  Where  a  company  established  in  a  Member  State  (such  as  Stanley) 
pursues  the  activity  of  collecting  bets  through  the  intermediary  of  an 
organisation of agencies established in another Member State (such as the 
defendants in the main proceedings), any restrictions on the activities of 
those agencies constitute obstacles to the freedom of establishment. " 
The Court's position on this issue was in line with the Advocate General's 
opinion, which stated that: 
"80.  Under  the  broad  definition  which  the  Court  gave  to  the  scope  of 
freedom  of  establishment  in  Commission  v  Germany  [judgement  of  4 
December  1986,  case  C-205/84],  an  undertaking  which  maintains  a 
permanent presence in another Member State is covered by the provisions 
of the Treaty on the right of establishment, 'even if that presence does not 
take  the  form  of  a  branch  or  agency,  but  consists  merely  of  an  office 
managed by the undertaking's own staff or by a person who is independent 
but authorised to act on a permanent basis for the undertaking, as would be 
the case with an agency". 
                                                 
3   SEC(97)1193 final.  
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This  has  been  confirmed  and  clarified  by  the  Court  in  two  subsequent 
judgements of 8 September 2010 in joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C- 
360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, Markus Stob and others, and in case C-
409/06, Winner Wetten where it held (in paragraph 46) that: 
"the concept of establishment is a very broad one, allowing a Community 
national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic 
life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, 
so  contributing  to  economic  and  social  interpenetration  within  the 
European Community in the sphere of activities as self-employed persons 
(see, in particular, Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR1-4165, paragraph 
25). Thus, the maintenance of a permanent presence in a Member State by 
an undertaking established in another Member State may fall within the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  on  the  freedom  of  establishment  even  if  that 
presence does not take the form of a branch or agency, but consists merely 
of an office managed by a person who is independent but authorised to act 
on a permanent basis for that undertaking, as would be the case "with an 
agency  (see  Case  205/84  Commission  v  Germany  [1986]  ECR  3755, 
paragraph 21)" 
If  follows  that,  by  analogy  with  this  case  law,  if  the  PI  maintains  a 
permanent presence in another Member State, even if that presence consists 
merely of an office managed by an agent who is independent but authorised 
to act on a permanent basis for the undertaking, it has to be considered as 
having, through its agents, a form of establishment in the host country. 
This case law was primarily meant to distinguish cross-border provision of 
services from 'right of establishment' situations, since both situations do not 
entail  the  same  legal  consequences  in  terms  of  compliance  with  host 
country rules.  
It could however be a useful source in cases where it is necessary to identify 
criteria  to  assess  whether  the  agent  can  be  considered  as  a  'form  of 
establishment'  with  a  view  to  distinguishing  situations  where  the  PI 
provides cross-border services from those where it falls under the right of 
establishment regime. But the fact that such 'form of establishment' could 
not be legally assimilated to a 'branch' of the Payment Institution prevents 
any automatic extension to the 'agents' of the legal regime applicable to 
'branches'. 
c) Allocation of supervisory powers between home and host authorities  
The  European  Commission  services  consider  that  the  supervisory 
authorities of both home and host Member States must closely cooperate for 
the purpose of monitoring and enforcing compliance by the PI – as well as  
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its agents providing services under its responsibility- with both the PSD and 
the AMLD obligations.  
This could prove a challenging task for both home and host authorities in 
cases where a given PI works with hundreds of agents in Member State B. 
On-site inspections of such high numbers of agents by the home country 
authorities would, in particular, prove quite a daunting task for the home 
country  authorities'  resources  and,  for  that  reason,  the  PSD  provides  (at 
Article 25§3) that such on-site inspections may be delegated to the host 
Member State. On-site inspection of a large number of agents is a challenge 
to the resources of host country authorities too, a fact that the home country 
authority should take carefully into account when approving the registration 
of agents by a PI. 
Proper  cooperation  between  both  authorities  is  therefore  all  the  more 
important. But cooperation is not only important, it is also a legal obligation 
expressly provided for in Article 25§2 of the PSD and further mentioned in 
Article  25§4  which  states  that  it  is  the  obligation  of  home  and  host 
authorities to: 
 "(…) provide each other with all essential and/or relevant information, 
in particular in the case of infringements or suspected infringements by 
an agent, a branch or an entity to which activities are outsourced. In 
this regard, the competent authorities shall communicate, upon request, 
all  relevant  information  and,  on  their  own  initiative,  all  essential 
information." 
The PSD, in spite of its full harmonisation nature, leaves some room for 
manoeuvre  to  competent  authorities  to  flesh  out  in  more  detail  their 
cooperation and, in particular, the nature of the information they wish to 
exchange  between  themselves.  Such  cooperation  could  be  subject  to 
bilateral or, ideally, multilateral agreements between competent authorities 
of  the  Member  States,  with  a  view  to  organising,  on  a  day-to-day  and 
practical basis, the details and modalities of the cooperation. In this context, 
the European Commission services support the useful work which is already 
underway in the context of the AML sub-committee (AMLC) of the Joint 
Committee  of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities  with  a  view  to 
concluding such a cooperation agreement which would, of course, have to 
be in conformity with the rights and duties provided for by both the PSD 
and the AMLD.  
Preventative powers 
Under  Article  17§1  of  the  PSD,  the  home  Member  State's  competent 
authority has a crucial preventative role to play, in particular in verifying  
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the accuracy of the information which the payment institution wishing to 
work  with  agents  has  to  communicate  before  commencing  its  activities, 
especially a "description of the internal control mechanisms that will be 
used by the agents in order to comply with the obligations in relation to 
money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing"  (17§1b))  and  the  "identity  of 
directors and persons responsible for the management of the agent (…) and 
evidence that they are fit and proper persons" (17§1c)). 
It  is  however  clear  that  such  verifications  being  operated  by  the  home 
authorities on a remote and distant basis and concerning agents which are 
located  in  the  host  country,  cannot  be  fully  efficient  without  proper 
involvement  of  the  host  authorities.  This  indispensable  cooperation  is 
clearly stated at Article 17§5 and 6 (pre-notification stage) and 25§2 (post-
notification stage) of the PSD.  
The host Member State authorities have substantial preventative powers. 
Before the agent is registered by the home country, they can express an 
"opinion"  which  could  dissuade  the  home  Member  State  authorities  to 
register the agent (Article 17§5). They can also inform the home Member 
State authorities that the engagement of agents could in their view increase 
the risk of money laundering (Article 17§6). This could for example happen 
in situations where the host Member State considers that using local retail 
agents which are not, themselves, designated professions under the AMLD, 
increases the risk of money laundering as such retailers might not be trained 
and  equipped  to  effectively  comply  with  obligations  under  the  AMLD 
(Customer  Due  Diligence,  special  attention,  reporting  to  FIUs,  record 
keeping,  internal  controls,  risk  assessments,  employee  training  programs 
etc.). 
The  host  country  authorities  should  not,  however,  unduly  restrict  the 
exercise of the PI's rights by, for example, disproportionately delaying their 
own verification and control duties once they have received a notification.   
The  home  Member  State  authorities  may  refuse  to  register  the  agent(s). 
However, it is clear from the whole economy of the system that the non-
binding  opinion  of  the  host  authorities,  which  have  far  better  means  of 
appreciating  and  verifying  the  actual  AML  fit  and  proper  nature  of  the 
agents who are located in their own territory, should be taken with utmost 
consideration  by  the  home  authorities  which,  while  they  may  in  theory 
depart from the host authorities' opinion, should at least be able to provide a 
convincing justification for doing so ('comply or explain' approach).      
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Repressive powers 
Once  the  agent's  activities  have  started,  home  and  host  authorities  shall 
cooperate on the basis of Articles 24, 25§2, 25§3, 25§4 and 17§6 of the 
PSD,  and  significant  powers  are,  again,  granted  to  both  home  and  host 
authorities. 
The home country's competent authorities can take a series of prudential 
measures listed in Article 21 of the PSD (on-site inspections, information 
requests, withdrawal of the PI's authorisation). Under Article 17§6 of the 
PSD, they may withdraw the agent's registration if money laundering or 
terrorist financing is or has taken place in the host country.  
Article 17§6 of the PSD provides for the following procedure: 
"If  the  competent  authorities  of  the host Member State have reasonable 
grounds to suspect that, in connection with the intended engagement of the 
agent  or  establishment  of  the  branch,  money  laundering  or  terrorist 
financing within the meaning of Directive 2005/60/EC is taking place, has 
taken place or been attempted, or that the engagement of such agent or 
establishment of such branch could increase the risk of money laundering 
or terrorist financing, they shall so inform the competent authorities of the 
home Member State, which may refuse to register the agent or branch, or 
may withdraw the registration, if already made, of the agent or branch. " 
In cases covered by Article 17§6 of the PSD, even after the commencing of 
the  operations  -  and  without  prejudice  to  enforcing  their  own  AML 
legislation - it is possible for the host Member State authorities to express 
serious concerns to the home Member State authorities about the agent's 
respect of the host country's AML obligations. The home authorities, once 
alerted,  may  withdraw  the  agent's  registration.  Such  final  withdrawal 
decision is also, formally, the responsibility of the home Member State. But 
as in the case of the initial registration, it seems very desirable, for the sake 
of good cooperation between supervisors and maximum AML efficiency, 
that  utmost  consideration  be  granted  by  the  home  Member  State  to  the 
opinion of the host authorities in that matter, and where the home Member 
State decides to disregard the host's opinion it provides proper explanation 
for doing so ('comply or explain').   
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d) Do agents have to comply with AMLD requirements ?  
Article 17§1b) of the PSD requires the home supervisor to assess, inter alia, 
"the internal control mechanisms that will be used by the agents in order to 
comply with the obligations in relation to money laundering and terrorist 
financing (emphasis added)."   
Although  it  is  not  explicitly  stated,  the  territorial  nature  of  the  AMLD 
implies that agents themselves, acting on behalf of the PI, have to comply 
with AMLD requirements of the host country. But agents' AML obligations 
would not find their source directly in the AMLD itself, but rather by way 
of the contract that they have signed with the PI, which is responsible for 
the oversight of its agents and is, therefore, liable for all possible breaches 
of AML requirements by its agents. This is confirmed in recital 28 of the 
AMLD: 
"In the case of agency or outsourcing relationships on a contractual basis 
between  institutions  or  persons  covered  by  this  Directive  and  external 
natural or legal persons not covered hereby, any anti-money laundering 
and  anti-terrorist  financing  obligations  for  those  agents  or  outsourcing 
service  providers  as  part  of  the  institutions  or  persons  covered  by  this 
Directive, may only arise from contract and not from this Directive. The 
responsibility  for  complying  with  this  Directive  should  remain  with  the 
institution or person covered hereby." 
In cases where agents are, themselves, an entity (e.g. a bank branch or a 
bureau de change) covered by the AMLD, their compliance with AMLD 
obligations derives directly from the directives.   
PIs' different business models 
PIs working with retail agents who are not entities covered by the AMLD 
are faced with different options:  
–  To rely, by contract, on the agents to perform the AMLD obligations 
(CDD,  vigilance,  reporting  etc.)  on  behalf  of  the  payment  institution 
itself. This scenario implies that the PI has devoted adequate resources so 
that the agent is seriously trained and equipped in order to perform CDD 
and  file  suspicious  transactions  in  accordance  with  the  host  state 
legislation,  and  that  adequate  internal controls, within the meaning of 
Article 17§1b) of the PSD, are in place.  
–  To  consider  that  it  is  not  opportune  that  retail  agents  perform  AML 
checks and file suspicious transaction reports and that, therefore, retail 
agents  should  simply  perform  book  entry  and  execute  the  payment 
services.  AML  requirements,  including  the  reporting  of  suspicious  
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transactions, would then have to be performed by the PI itself either on a 
remote  basis  from  the  home  country  or  by  a  representative  of  the  PI 
situated in Member State B who would be tasked with compliance and 
reporting duties. It seems to the Commission services, on the basis of 
information gathered from some market players in the money remittance 
area, that this latter option is the one favoured and applied by 'main street' 
players. However, it cannot be excluded that some other market players 
in the money remittance business already/will choose to rely on the retail 
agents  themselves  to  perform  the  AML  requirements (CDD, reporting 
etc.). The Commission services are also aware of business models where 
compliance and reporting duties are carried out from a 'hub' in a Member 
State C.   
When assessing the business model of a PI and, in particular, the adequacy 
of the PI's internal controls, home and host authorities must assess whether 
the fact that AML duties might be performed by retail agents themselves 
may imply some threats in AML policy terms. 
It  seems  to  many  AML  supervisors  (but  not  to  all)  that  -  even  with 
appropriate  training  and  adequate  internal  control  mechanisms  -  retail 
agents  such  as  grocery  shops  and  petrol  stations  would  be  inadequately 
suited  to  perform  efficient  due  diligence,  to  identify  possible  suspicious 
activities or to prepare meaningful suspicious transaction reports (STRs). 
As regards the specific reporting obligation, Article 22§2 of the AMLD 
would tend to confirm this assessment, stating that: "(…) The person or 
persons  designated  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  provided  for  in 
Article 34 shall normally forward the information." 
If  they  reached  such  conclusions,  home  authorities  (granting  utmost 
consideration to the opinion expressed by the host authorities) may refuse 
ex-ante  (Article  17§4  of  the  PSD)  or  withdraw,  after  commencement of 
activities, the agent's registration (Article 17§6 of the PSD). 
e) To whose FIU shall suspicious transaction reports be forwarded?  
Article 22§2 of the AMLD states that:  
"The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be forwarded to the FIU 
of the Member State in whose territory the institution or person forwarding 
the information is situated (…)."  
It seems desirable, in the whole economy of the AMLD, that the reporting 
of suspicious transactions be done to the country B's FIU. The reported 
information would indeed best benefit the FIU in country B which, being 
the FIU of the country where the suspicion was raised, is best placed to  
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appreciate what to do with the report and subsequently proceed with any 
appropriate follow-up.   
Different interpretations of Article 22§2 of the AMLD have been presented 
to the Commission services. Some argued that the reporting has to be done 
to Member State A's FIU, considering that it is the country where the PI is 
'situated'. However, based on the Gambelli case law described above, it can 
be  argued  that,  through  its  agents,  the  PI  is  established  ('situated')  in 
Member State B, within the meaning of Article 22§2. It can therefore be 
argued  that  the  PI  itself  (or,  in  some  cases,  its  agents)  should  report 
suspicious transactions to Member State B's FIU. Reporting from the PI 
(situated in Member State A) to Member State B's FIU would raise clear 
questions in terms of language, format and content of STR, which differ 
from one country to the other.  
In order to ensure a level playing field, to seek maximum legal certainty and 
to obtain the best operational benefits, the European Commission services 
are currently assessing whether to: 
- consider a future legislative clarification of the directive on this precise 
issue, by introducing an explicit requirement that reporting be done to the 
host country FIU and, 
- rely on FIUs' future work in order to facilitate the smooth cross-border 
transmission and exploitation of suspicious transaction reports. Such work 
should  take  into  account,  in  particular,  Council  Decision  of  17  October 
2000  concerning  arrangements  for  cooperation  between  financial 
intelligence  units  of  the  Member  States  in  respect  of  exchanging 
information.  Consideration  must  also  be  given  to  work  on  STR  sharing 
carried out by the EGMONT Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
4  
f) Can the host country impose a certain form of establishment ? 
The European Commission services are aware of the fact that, in order to 
simplify and clarify the issues of compliance, supervision and reporting, 
some Member States authorities are tempted to impose on PIs certain forms 
of establishment or permanent structures within their territory. In particular 
the latter are inclined to require that the PI establish a fully-fledged branch 
within their territory or, at least, that it establish a central point of contact in 
order  to,  inter  alia,  streamline  the  collection  and  the  transfer  of  AML 
                                                 
4   http://www.egmontgroup.org/  
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compliance related information with a view to facilitating the supervisory 
tasks of the host country authorities. 
Such a requirement has to be examined in the context of the fact that the 
AMLD is a minimum harmonisation directive and that Article 25§5 of the 
PSD states that paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 25 of the PSD are "without 
prejudice  to  the  obligation  of  competent  authorities  under  Directive 
2005/60/EC and Regulation (EC)  o 1781/2006, in particular under Article 
37(1) of Directive 2005/60/EC and Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC)  o 
1781/2006 to supervise or monitor the compliance with the requirements 
laid down in those instruments."  
If such a permanent structure is not created by the PI on its own initiative, a 
scenario which is already observed in the market place since it facilitates in 
fine the PI's activities, any possible requirement imposed by either home or 
host authorities to set one up would have to be carefully assessed in light of 
both PSD and AMLD objectives and provisions, and of the Treaty rules on 
the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.  
This assessment may differ depending on the PI's business model and the 
potential requirements imposed by the supervisory authorities:  
·  If the PI wishes to work on a 'pure' cross-border basis, i.e. without any 
establishment of any form (which seems unlikely as far as the activity of 
money remittance is concerned since a presence seems necessary at the 
transmitting/receiving end to send or deliver the money), the very fact of 
requiring any form of establishment would constitute a restriction to the 
freedom  to  provide  services,  guaranteed  by  Article  56  of  the  Treaty, 
which would have to be thoroughly justified as being indispensable to 
achieve a public-interest objective. In its judgement of 20 May 1992 in 
Case C-106/91, Ramrath,
5 the Court held that the host Member State's 
requirements  relating  to  the  existence  of  an  infrastructure  within  the 
national territory and the service provider's actual presence appeared to 
be  justified  in  order  to  safeguard  the  public  interest  relating  to  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  auditors.  In  this  respect  it  could  be 
observed that, a fortiori, the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing could be considered as a sufficient public interest objective. 
·  In the case of an imposed limit to the form of secondary establishment, 
e.g.  a  requirement  to  set  up  a  fully-fledged  branch  instead  of  (or  in 
                                                 
5   European Court reports 1992 Page I-03351.   
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addition to) only having local agents, such a requirement could constitute 
a restriction of Article 49§1 of the Treaty which, in accordance with the 
ECJ's case law, would have to be carefully justified. 
6 
·  As to a possible requirement from the host (or the home) country to set 
up  a  'super-agent'/'central  contact  point  for  agents,  or  to  have  a 
'compliance  officer'  on  their  territory,  its  proportionality  has  to  be 
carefully  examined.  In  terms  of  necessity,  it  seems  obvious  that  such 
structures could play a useful role in AML compliance and supervision 
terms  for  the  benefit  of  both  home  and  host  authorities. 
In particular, in situations where a PI has a high number of retail agents 
in the host country, having one of these agents - or a representative of the 
PI  -  play  an  interface  role  with  both  home  and  host  authorities  may 
increase the efficiency of the whole system. It could also help the PI itself 
to satisfy its AMLD requirements. By analogy, one could see a precedent 
in  Article  38  and  39  of  Directive  2008/118/EC
7  on  the  general 
arrangements for excise duty and Article 204 of Directive 2006/112/EC
8 
on  the common system of value added tax which accept, under some 
conditions, the presence of a 'tax representative' in the host country. 
The European Commission services would therefore, a priori, not oppose 
such  a  requirement,  but  subject  to  the  respect  of  the  proportionality 
condition. In other words, the costs of having such a centralised structure on 
top of the existing agents should not outweigh the intended benefits.  
g) PIs' liability 
In accordance with Article 18 of the PSD, payment institutions are fully 
liable for any acts of, among others, "any agent, branch or entity to which 
activities are outsourced". 
                                                 
6   ECJ, C-270/83, Commission vs. France. See also case C-106-/91, Ramrath . 
7   OJ L 9/12, 14.01.2009, p. 1. 
8   OJ L 347/1, 11.12.2006, p.1.  
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2)  A  payment  institution  from  Member  State  A  has  a  branch  in 
Member State B 
a) Whose competent authority supervises the branch ? 
Allocation of responsibilities 
Article 37§1 of the AMLD requires the competent authorities to "effectively 
monitor  and  to  take  the  necessary  measures  with  a  view  to  ensuring 
compliance with the requirements of this Directive by all the institutions 
and persons covered by this Directive".  
Article 37§2 of the AMLD states that: 
"Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have adequate 
powers, including the power to compel the production of any information 
that is relevant to monitoring compliance and perform checks, and have 
adequate resources to perform their functions." 
The territorial nature of the AMLD attributes a prominent supervisory role 
to the host country, being understood as the Member State where the branch 
is  established.  However,  formally,  there  is  no  exclusive  allocation  of 
supervisory responsibility, as regards compliance by a branch of a payment 
institution with the AMLD obligations to either home or host Member State 
authorities.  
As  a  result,  as  already  explained  in  the  European  Commission's  Staff 
Working paper on Compliance with the AMLD by cross-border banking 
groups at group level:
9 
"…in all Member States, locally established subsidiaries or branches of 
credit and financial institutions from other Member States (as well as from 
third countries) are subject to local AML supervision like the local credit 
and financial institutions. At the same time, despite the absence of a clear 
framework in the AML Directive regarding supervision on AML compliance 
by  groups,  in  almost  all  Member  States  (if  not  all),  AML  supervision 
carried  out  by  the  supervisory  authority  of  the  parent  institution 
encompasses the branches and subsidiaries located in other EU Member 
States. In some Member States, such as FR or DE, this is an explicit legal 
requirement, while in other Member States, such as IE, it is the result of 
supervisory guidance. In other Member States, such as BE, EL,  L or the 
                                                 
9   SEC(2009)939final, 30.6.2009.  
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UK, the focus of the supervisory authority is on the head office and its 
senior  management  responsible  for  ensuring  that their foreign branches 
and subsidiaries are complying with the group AML standard. The obvious 
result is that more than one national supervisor may intervene for the same 
group  in  different  countries,  thus  making  duplications  (and  potentially 
divergences) possible." 
 
The  European  Commission  services  consider  that  the  supervisory 
authorities of both home and host Member States have to be involved in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance of the branch with the AMLD. Since 
the branch is, legally speaking, a payment institution subject in full to the 
AMLD obligations (Customer Due Diligence and reporting obligations, in 
particular),  it  is  obvious  that  the  AMLD  supervisory  authorities  of  the 
country where the branch is situated must ensure that it complies with local 
AML rules. But the home country, i.e. that where the PI is authorised, also 
has an important role to play, not only from a prudential viewpoint but also, 
in cooperation with the host country authorities, in supervising the branch's 
compliance with the AMLD through, for instance, on-site inspections (see 
Article 25§2 of the PSD).  
Cooperation 
This joint involvement is without prejudice to the prudential cooperation 
between the supervisory authorities of the host Member State (presumably 
both the prudential supervisor and the AMLD supervisor) and of the home 
Member  State,  which  could  even  lead  to  a  refusal//withdrawal  of  the 
registration  of  agents  or  branches  or  of  the  authorisation  of  payment 
institutions. Such formal decisions can however only be made by the home 
Member State even if the irregular conduct takes place in the host Member 
State. But, as for agents, it seems very desirable, for the sake of a good 
cooperation between supervisors, that utmost consideration be granted by 
the home Member State to the opinion of the host authorities in that matter, 
and where the home Member State decides to disregard the host's opinion it 
provides proper explanation for doing so ('comply or explain').  
It should be noted that the "supervisory authorities" within the meaning of 
the AMLD and the PSD may not be the same. But Article 24§2c) of the 
PSD facilitates their cooperation by obliging Member States to allow the 
exchange  of  information  between  the  different  categories  of  supervisory 
authorities,  in  particular  between  the  PSD  and  the  AMLD  supervisory 
authorities.   
16 
b) To whose Financial intelligence unit (FIU) is the branch supposed to 
report suspicious transactions?  
The AMLD states in Article 22§1 that "Member States shall require the 
institutions  […]  covered  by  this  Directive  […]"  to  file  suspicious 
transaction reports with the FIU. Paragraph 2 of the same Article states that 
the  information  "shall  be forwarded to the FIU of the Member State in 
whose  territory  the  institution  or  person  forwarding  the  information  is 
situated." 
As stated above, Article 3§2 f) of the AMLD includes the "branches of 
financial institutions" within the definition of "financial institutions". The 
branch  is  therefore,  itself,  an  institution  subject  to  the  AMLD  reporting 
obligations. In light of the fact that the branch shall be considered, for the 
purposes of the AMLD, as a separate entity subject to reporting obligations, 
it is the European Commission services' opinion that the reporting must be 
made by the branch to the FIU of the country where it is situated, i.e. that of 
Member State B. This FIU of Member State B may then inform the FIU of 
Member State A if this is relevant for the investigation, in accordance with 
existing rules governing the cooperation of FIUs.
10 
                                                 
10   See in particular Council Decision 2000/642 of 17 October 2000.  